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 Following the first entry of Canadian troops into battle at 2 nd Ypres in April 1915, the 
machine gun for a time dominated public and political discussion in Canada. Both the 
Canadian public and the government determined that they needed to do all that they 
could to get as many of these weapons into the hands of Canadian troops as possible. An 
examination of this phenomenon reveals much about the mood of the Canadian public 
and the difficulties experienced by the government as both came to realize in a more 
urgent sense than ever before just would be involved in waging a war of a scale and 
intensity that few had conceived of. 
 Après l’envoi au front des premières troupes canadiennes en avril 1915 durant la 
Deuxième bataille d’Ypres, la mitrailleuse a monopolisé tous les débats publics et 
politiques au Canada pendant un certain temps. Le public et le gouvernement canadiens 
avaient décidé de part et d’autre qu’il fallait tout faire pour mettre autant de ces armes 
que possible dans les mains des troupes canadiennes. L’étude de ce phénomène en dit 
long sur l’humeur de la population canadienne et sur les difficultés qu’éprouvait le 
gouvernement canadien quand tous deux prirent plus vivement conscience que jamais 
des conséquences véritables de mener une guerre d’une ampleur et d’une intensité que 
peu avaient imaginées. 
 THE MACHINE GUN stands out as one of the iconic weapons of the First World 
War. Images of this grim, automatic weapon, in the shape of a sawed-off water 
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pipe, spewing hails of bullets and mowing down waves of advancing infantry, 
have, in many ways, come to dominate the popular imagery of the war. In fact, 
artillery killed more of the fighting troops than did machine guns. Also, by the 
last months of 1916, the fighting armies had developed tactics that helped to 
mitigate the machine gun’s impact, although to the end of the war it remained 
a significant threat to soldiers advancing in the open.  1  No army went to war in 
1914 fully aware of the machine gun’s killing capacity, although the carnage that 
it wrought in any number of early engagements – at Neuve Chapelle in March 
1915, for example, German machine guns cut down 1,000 British infantry in a 
single attack  2  – soon woke them up. As a result, the machine gun components 
of all combatant armies, including Canada’s, continued to grow until the end 
of the war, although scenarios of mass slaughter were most typical of the war’s 
first couple of years, when the weapon’s destructive power was still being real-
ized and before essential countervailing tactics had been developed. During this 
period especially, machine guns seemed to rule the battlefield. 
 The troops of the Canadian Expeditionary Force entered battle for the first 
time in April 1915, in the Second Battle of Ypres, in Belgium.  3  Although no 
single incident rivalled the damage inflicted on the British at Neuve Chapelle, 
Canadians found the fire of German machine guns to be ferocious and its 
effects tragic. As a veteran of the fighting expressed to an audience in Victoria, 
machine guns were “the most deadly weapon in modern war. At Langemarck 
[near Ypres] the woods were full of them and it was pitiful to see our men 
mowed down by the German machine gunners.”  4  It was the devastating power 
of machine guns – interestingly enough, not the use by the Germans of poison 
gas – that dominated veterans’ accounts of battle and the nation’s press cov-
erage. The result was a huge welling of concern among the Canadian public 
about the well-being of Canadian “boys” in the face of such death-dealing 
technology. At the same time, some members of the government engaged fer-
vently in efforts to ensure that the demands of the public and the needs of the 
troops were met with a substantial increase in the number of machine guns 
being sent to the front. 
 1  Two of the best discussions of tactical evolution in the war are: for the Canadian Corps, Bill Rawling,  Sur-
viving Trench Warfare: Technology and the Canadian Corps, 1914-1918 (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1992); for the British Army as a whole, Paddy Griffith,  Battle Tactics of the Western Front: The British 
Army’s Art of Attack, 1916-1918 (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1994). For the Canadian 
involvement in the war as a whole, the standard accounts are: A Fortescue Duguid,  Official History of the 
Canadian Forces in the Great War 1914-1919 , 2 vols. (Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1938), covering the first year; 
G. W. L. Nicholson,  Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1919 (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1964); Tim Cook, 
 At the Sharp End: Canadians Fighting the Great War (Toronto: Viking, 2007) and  Shock Troops: Canadians 
Fighting the Great War, 1917-1918 (Toronto: Viking, 2008). 
 2  Martin Samuels,  Command or Control? Command, Training and Tactics in the British and German Armies, 
1888-1918 (London: Frank Cass, 1995), p. 85. 
 3  See Daniel Dancocks,  Welcome to Flanders Fields: The First Canadian Battle of the Great War: Ypres, 1915 
(Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1988); Nathan Greenfield,  Baptism of Fire: The Second Battle of Ypres and 
the Forging of Canada, April 1915 (Toronto: Harper Collins, 2007). 
 4  Colonel Lorne Ross, quoted in  The Daily Colonist (Victoria), July 16, 1915, p. 4. 
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 This close look at the rise and fall of Canada’s machine gun mania provides 
fresh and revealing insights into the mood of the Canadian civilian population 
towards the war at this point and, in particular, its reaction to this specific exem-
plar of the war’s arsenal of killing. At the same time, it illuminates reactions 
within the government of Prime Minister Sir Robert Borden, casting light on its 
inner workings as members scrambled to come to grips with urgent demands, 
both from the front and from the public at home, for a great many more machine 
guns than had ever been thought necessary. Copious correspondence and official 
files among the militia department’s papers at the Library and Archives Canada, 
the personal papers of some of the key individuals involved, and the extensive 
coverage in the nation’s press have all been combed to elucidate this significant 
and fascinating episode in Canada’s First World War history. The contents of 
these various sources help us to appreciate more fully the reaction of the Cana-
dian public, the press, and the military, political, and ministerial/bureaucratic 
worlds to the stresses engendered by the full and bloody immersion of Canadian 
troops in a war whose destructive nature few had conceived of before. 
 Historical accounts of the war’s early years highlight the somewhat calamity-
prone efforts by Borden’s government to deal with the enormous and complex 
demands generated by the war effort. Most of the problems are seen as being 
directly traceable to the energetic but erratic and inefficient leadership of the 
minister of militia, Sam Hughes. These included, but are not limited to, poorly 
manufactured boots and unsuitable load-bearing equipment, incompetence and 
possible corruption in the ordering of shells, overly prolonged support for the 
problem-plagued Ross Rifle, and the maintenance of a frustratingly complex and 
inefficient system governing the administration of Canadian troops overseas.  5  
The machine gun issue, however, was mostly handled by some of Hughes’s lead-
ing critics within the government, who saw the minister’s absence on a trip to 
England as an opportunity to introduce some much-needed sense and rationality 
into the operation of the militia department. That their efforts came to hopeless 
grief, in the case of the machine gun issue at least, dramatically exposes the 
complexities facing the Borden government in placing military procurement on 
a sound and rational footing, even without the problematic Hughes at the heart 
of the matter. For the government, and particularly for Prime Minister Borden, 
it came to constitute a major problem in civil-military relations, necessitating 
difficult choices, both in handling a Canadian public seriously aroused over the 
issue and in determining the role that private versus public money should play in 
the prosecution of the war effort. 
 5  Two standard accounts that address these issues are Nicholson,  Canadian Expeditionary Force , pp. 201-212; 
and John Swettenham,  To Seize the Victory: The Canadian Corps in World War I (Toronto: The Ryerson 
Press, 1965), pp. 56-60. The two leading accounts of Hughes are Tim Cook,  The Madman and the Butcher: 
The Sensational Wars of Sam Hughes and General Arthur Currie (Toronto: Allen Lane Canada, 2010); Ron-
ald G. Haycock,  Sam Hughes: The Public Career of a Controversial Canadian (Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Lau-
rier University Press, 1986). On the problems with the overseas ministry, see Desmond Morton,  A Peculiar 
Kind of Politics: Canada’s Overseas Ministry in the First World War (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1982). 
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 Following the practice of the British Army, Canada was obliged to provide 
two machine guns for every battalion of infantry. At the war’s outbreak, how-
ever, the country possessed a grand total of only 43 of the weapons, all of an 
obsolete type.  6  Nonetheless, this was a time of unusual preoccupation with 
the machine gun in Canada. The roots of this interest require more intensive 
investigation than can be undertaken here, but it does seem to have been asso-
ciated, to no insignificant degree, with the enthusiasm of Sam Hughes. The 
minister saw himself as something of a visionary when it came to equipping the 
Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF), and in this instance, at least, he veered 
onto the right track. Studies of the use of machine guns by both sides in the 
Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 inspired a sub-culture of military officers in 
Europe who were convinced that the weapon’s fire power was a key to success 
in modern battle.  7  In Britain, a small group of enthusiasts preached the weap-
on’s virtues (in the face of official indifference) at the  British Army’s School of 
Musketry at Hythe. A visitor there in 1912 was Sam Hughes, who came away 
impressed by the demonstrations of the weapon that he had witnessed.  8  
  
 Image 1:  Testing a Vickers gun, September 1916. Canadian War Museum, 
19920044-674. 
 6  Duguid,  Official History of the Canadian Forces in the Great War , p. 81. 
 7  See G. S. Hutchison,  Machine Guns: Their Employment and Tactical Employment (London: Macmillan, 
1938), pp. 105-110; Paul Cornish,  Machine Guns and the Great War (Barnsley, UK: Pen & Sword Books), 
pp. 28-30. 
 8  An account of the visit to Hythe can be found in  Report of the Militia Council for the Dominion of Canada 
for the Fiscal Year Ending March 31 1913 (Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1914), pp. 132-133. 
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 Soon after, under his auspices, the department of militia put in an order with the 
Vickers Company of Great Britain for 50 of its latest Mark I weapons. Adopted by 
the British Army in 1912, the Vickers would prove to be perhaps the most highly 
regarded weapon of its type in the war. Another indication of his special interest in 
machine guns at the start of the war was the support Hughes accorded on August 
13 to the proposal of another, more substantial, machine gun enthusiast, Raymond 
Brutinel, to form a unit of machine-gun-equipped armoured vehicles. A former 
officer in the French Army, Brutinel had settled in the Canadian west in 1905, 
where he earned a fortune in minerals exploration. At the same time, he main-
tained an interest in military matters, particularly the machine gun, as discussed 
in the literature that was appearing about it in the wake of the Russo-Japanese 
War.  9  Still later in 1914, Hughes lent equally enthusiastic support to the formation 
through private funding of two other motorized machine gun units plus another 
that used horses. The funders of these initiatives were all men of substantial means, 
including, besides Brutinel’s backer Sir Clifford Sifton, department store magnate 
J. C. Eaton, northern mining entrepreneur “Klondike” Joe Boyle, and a group of 
prominent Montreal businessmen.  10  Still, the interest taken by Hughes, Brutinel, 
or any of the wealthy donors should not be assumed to indicate any widespread 
comprehension in the country as to the significance of machine guns. As the offi-
cial history of the Canadian Machine Gun Corps put it, although members of the 
militia in the immediate prewar period had “heard of machine guns, they excited 
no great amount of curiosity.”  11  The population at large remained profoundly (per-
haps blissfully) ignorant of the devastation the weapon could wreak. 
 All the above initiatives depended upon donations of money by wealthy citi-
zens. Donated money was used throughout the war to fund many undertakings. 
Usually, however, this was for charitable purposes, ranging from Belgian relief 
to buying tobacco and other amenities to send to the troops overseas. In addition, 
such major benevolent agencies as the Red Cross and the Canadian Patriotic 
Fund were dependent upon donated money, while donations were sometimes 
used to fund military hospitals and to acquire motor ambulances. Also, in these 
early years at least, private money was occasionally used to fund a number 
of specifically military initiatives, a notable example being Hamilton Gault’s 
personal contribution of $100,000 towards the formation of the Princess Patri-
cia’s Canadian Light Infantry.  12  
 9  Library and Archives Canada [hereafter LAC], MG 27 II D 15, 159295, Sir Clifford Sifton Papers, Sifton to 
the Hon. Sam Hughes, August 13, 1914. See also Yves Tremblay, “Brutinel: A Unique Kind of Leadership” 
in Bernd Horn and Stephen Harris, eds.,  Warrior Chiefs: Perspectives on Senior Canadian Military Leaders 
(Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2001), pp. 57-70; Cameron Pulsifer, “Canada’s First Armoured Unit: Raymond 
Brutinel and the Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigades of the First World War,”  Canadian Military History , 
vol. 10 (Winter 2001), pp. 45-57. 
 10  John F. Wallace,  Dragons of Steel: Canadian Armour in Two World Wars (Burnstown, ON: General Store 
Publishing, 1995), pp. 17-25. 
 11  C. S. Grafton,  The Canadian “Emma Gees”: A History of the Canadian Machine Gun Corps (London, ON: 
Canadian Machine Gun Corps Association, 1938), p. 23. 
 12  Jeffery Williams,  First in the Field: Gault of the Patricias (St. Catharines, ON: Vanwell, 1995), pp. 62-63. 
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 Significantly, the instances cited above of wealthy donors funding the acquisi-
tion of machine guns were the only occasions of privately donated monies being 
used to finance the purchase of a weapon of war. Why the machine gun was thus 
singled out is not clear. It no doubt had something to do with Sam Hughes’s 
enthusiasm for the weapon and the highly personalized approach he took to 
equipping the CEF. It may also have had something to do with the weapon’s 
relative novelty. Hughes and other backers may well have concluded that, lack-
ing the bona fides of such well-established items of the military arsenal as rifles, 
bayonets, and artillery, the weapon needed some external financial help to assert 
its importance. Indeed, Hughes might well have extended the practice of using 
donated monies to fund other specifically military initiatives, had it had not been 
for the events that unfolded over machine guns. 
 Great Britain was the usual supplier of nearly all the military armaments 
acquired by Canada. It soon encountered problems with regard to machine guns, 
however. Vickers’ production was nowhere near the level required for Brit-
ain’s expanding war effort, and the British government soon determined that it 
required every gun that the company could manufacture for its own army. As a 
result, even the 50 guns that Canada already had on order were never delivered. 
With no home-based production capacity, the department of militia was forced 
to look elsewhere for the machine guns it needed and turned to the major North 
American manufacturer of machine guns, the Colt Patent Firearms Company of 
Hartford, Connecticut. Canadians had used an earlier model of the Colt Com-
pany’s machine gun in South Africa in 1899-1902 and found it highly satisfacto-
ry.  13  On August 29, 1914, officials in the department contacted Colt and ordered 
50 of its latest 1914-Model weapon. Two months later, with a 2 nd Division being 
formed, they ordered another 250 of the Colt guns.  14  In November, however, 
the British War Office doubled the number of machine guns required per bat-
talion from two to four, and the commander of Canadian forces in England soon 
demanded additional supplies.  15  
 Although the 1914-Model Colt had the same rate of fire as the Vickers and 
was slightly less cumbersome, it was far from an ideal weapon. Its vast number 
of parts made it a “mechanic’s nightmare,” and numerous and costly alterations 
were required before the Canadians could take it to the front. Any machine gun 
was better than none, however, and the Colt was used by the CEF until, finally, 
in July 1916, enough Vickers became available to supply Canadian needs. By 
the time Canadian troops entered their first major battle of the war at the Second 
Battle of Ypres in April 1915, the militia department had obtained a total of 300 
Colts. One hundred and fourteen of these were overseas, 84 with the 1 st Division 
 13  Carman Miller,  Painting the Map Red: Canada and the South African War, 1899-1902 (Montreal and Kings-
ton: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1993), p. 266. 
 14  LAC RG 24 1833 G.A.Q. 8-18, Historical Section, General Staff, “Colt and Lewis Machine Guns – The Colt 
Machine Gun,” 1934, p. 5. 
 15  Ibid. , pp. 1-5. 
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at the front.  16  Forty-eight would have been distributed among the division’s 12 
fighting battalions, leaving 36 in reserve. By the standards of the British Army at 
the time, Canadian troops were well equipped with the weapon as they entered 
their first major encounter with the Germans. However, the carnage of battle 
would soon prove how quickly the guns could disappear. 
 First Division’s machine gunners played a prominent role in the fighting at 
Second Ypres, but casualties were high, and many of their guns were destroyed.  17  
On May 11, J. W. Carson, Sam Hughes’s special representative in London, 
summed up the situation in a telegram to his boss. His words were typical of the 
drumbeat of dire news Ottawa would increasingly hear that stressed the need for 
more machine guns. “Our last severe engagement in France has played havoc 
with our Colt guns,” wrote Carson. 
 At the present time we have only eighteen effective guns with our Division in 
France [ sic ] and eight more are now being converted.... [W]e not only want to 
have a full establishment of guns but also a surplus of 150%, as while our troops 
are under shell fire as they were in the last engagement, and are shelled out of 
their trenches ... they are apt to lose their machine guns ... Colonel Meighen [com-
mander of the 14 th Battalion] for instance, told me that he did not have one gun 
 16  LAC RG 24 6533 HQ 640-1-4 Vol. 1,“Colt Machine Gun Statement,” April 5, 1915; also Statement by Maj. 
Gen. D. A. MacDonald, Quarter Master General, Ottawa, April 27, 1915, in  Report of the War Purchasing 
Commission , vol. 4,  Orders in Councils:  From May 8, 1915 to December 31, 1916 (Ottawa: King’s Printer, 
1916), p. 10. 
 17  See “Colt and Lewis Machine Guns,” pp. 8-18. Also, Andrew Iarocchi,  Shoestring Soldiers: The First Cana-
dian Division at War, 1914-1918 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008), p. 188. 
  
 Image 2:  Soldiers aiming a 1914-Model Colt Machine Gun, December 1914. Canadian War Museum, 
199900004-171. 
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left. He also told me that the German establishment was just double ours and that 
we should have at least eight guns per battalion. The matter is more than urgent.  18  
 The news coming from the front to Ottawa consistently stressed that the Germans 
were far better equipped with machine guns than were the Canadians. The obvi-
ous conclusion was that the Canadians desperately needed more guns to have any 
chance of confronting the enemy on equal terms, let alone defeat him. Typical was 
a message that the 1 st Division’s machine gun officer, Major A. E. Swift, wrote on 
June 23 to Major General Sam Steele, commander of the 2 nd Division, which had 
recently arrived in England. Swift, whose note would be forwarded to Hughes, urged 
that the requirement now was for 10 guns per battalion, “or 160 for a division,” as 
the Germans “had one [machine gun] for every 20 men, and I quite believe that they 
have that number, besides more in Reserve.”  19  Historians have subsequently shown 
that these claims of a huge German superiority in machine guns were vastly exag-
gerated and that, in fact, the numbers possessed by the combatant armies in 1914-
1915 were about equal. The difference was that the German Army employed its 
machine guns in batteries of six rather than split up piecemeal among the battalions, 
as was the case among British and Canadian forces. The coordinated fire of these 
German guns created devastating fields of fire that proved far more deadly than the 
more dispersed fire emitted by the British and Canadian guns. Such findings do not, 
however, change the fact that at the time British-Canadian troops ardently believed 
that the Germans had far more machine guns than they did.  20  
 Meanwhile, at home, Canadian newspapers were filled with accounts of the 
battle. The picture conveyed by these reports of the war that Canadians had 
entered was a far cry from the romanticized version of conflict contained in popu-
lar prewar accounts of British imperial triumphs. Whether they were supporters 
of the Liberal or Conservative parties, most Canadian newspapers were ardent 
supporters of the war. They depicted the conflict as one of civilized, Christian val-
ues, as represented by the Allies, opposing the ruthless, “hunnish” aggression of 
the Central Powers. As historian Jeffery Keshen and others have noted, although 
strict official censorship was soon imposed by the government, the newspapers 
themselves exercised a kind of self-censorship in their reporting of the conflict, 
focusing on the Allied and, more specifically, Canadian triumphs as opposed to 
those of the enemy. They did, however, at least in the early years, print accounts 
that conveyed the war’s violence and brutality. These, in turn, served to emphasize 
the grim nature of the struggle in which Canadian troops were engaged and with 
which they would have to come to grips if they were to prevail.  21  
 18  LAC RG 9 III A1 Ser.4 12 File 4-5-14 I, J. W. Carson to Sam Hughes, May 11, 1915. 
 19  Ibid., Maj. A. E. Swift to Maj. Gen. S. Steele, June 23, 1915; Maj. Gen. S. Steele to Sam Hughes, June 28, 
1915. 
 20  See Cornish,  Machine Guns and the Great War , pp. 35-37; Samuels,  Command or Control? , pp. 76-86. 
 21  Jeffrey Keshen,  Propaganda and Censorship During Canada’s Great War (Edmonton: University of Alberta 
Press, 1996), pp. 11-14; W. K. Kesterton,  A History of Journalism in Canada (Ottawa: McClelland & Stew-
art, 1967), pp. 183-191.
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 The portrait was of a battlefield dominated by overwhelming fire power, 
where little scope was left for human agency. The machine gun figured as a 
leading example of an arsenal of weapons that embodied all the latest advances 
of the industrial age. Success, these reports warned, would rest with the side that 
succeeded in bringing to bear the greatest quantities of such devastating materiel; 
at the moment, they emphasized, all the advantages lay with Germany. “‘Muni-
tions! Munitions! Munitions!’, these were the chief requirement for success,” 
Toronto’s  Globe reported the British commander-in-chief, Sir John French, as 
exclaiming just before the onset of Second Ypres.  22  The struggle had become 
“not one of men but of machinery,” continued Sir John. E. W. B. Morrison, the 
prewar editor of the Ottawa  Citizen , a veteran of the South African War, who was 
then serving in Flanders as a lieutenant colonel with the Royal Canadian Artil-
lery (and would later become General Officer Commanding the CEF’s artillery) 
put it thus: “ Human courage is of no avail against swarms of machine guns, an 
infinite number of hand bombs and high explosive shell of a power never expe-
rienced in warfare. ”  23  
 Machine guns, for the time being, received the lion’s share of coverage for 
the damaging toll of Canadian lives. Until at least November of that year, the 
weapon’s killing power and the need to get many more of them to Canadian 
battalions overseas became a major preoccupation of press coverage of the war 
and a major source of war-related anxiety in Canada. “The hail of bullets from 
machine guns has been far more deadly than the shrapnel of the field artillery,” 
proclaimed the  Globe on June 15, 1915.  The Daily Colonist of Victoria went fur-
ther in asserting that the “news from the front emphasizes the absolute necessity 
for equipping our men with as many machine guns as they can use. There is not 
the least possibility of too many guns being given.”  24  
 Coming, as they did, from both harassed officers at the front and an alarmed 
press at home, these demands convinced the government that urgent steps were 
necessary. As a start, on May 14, 1915, it ordered a further 125 weapons from 
Colt.  25  Over the next few months, however, a new and unexpected factor entered 
the government’s calculations. Increasingly, members of the public came for-
ward with offers of help to obtain the much-needed weapons with cash supplied 
from their own pockets. 
 Press reports of the devastating impact of machine guns on Canadian troops 
at Second Ypres not only severely alarmed the Canadian public but spurred its 
interest in doing what it could to ensure that the troops overseas received more 
of the weapons. Understanding that the regulated number was not enough, many 
Canadians concluded that they must take up the task of ensuring, through contri-
butions of their own funds, that Canadian troops received more of the powerful 
weapons. On May 5, with Second Ypres still raging, the staff of the Penitentiary 
 22  The Globe (Toronto), April 19, 1915, p. 6. 
 23  Ottawa Evening Journal , July 21, 1915, p. 6. Emphasis in original. 
 24  The Daily Colonist (Victoria), July 16, 1915, p. 4. 
 25 Report of the War Purchasing Commission , vol. 4, p. 5. 
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Services in Kingston, Ontario, announced the donation of two machine guns to 
that city’s 21 st Battalion.  26  This was followed on June 1 by two wealthy Montreal 
citizens, grain exporter and banker James Carruthers and the head of Redpath 
Sugar, Huntley R. Drummond (who had lost a brother at Second Ypres), declar-
ing that they would donate $100,000 each to help the government buy additional 
machine guns. These offers, noted the  Globe , were “gratefully accepted” by Sam 
Hughes.  27  A month later, eight Vancouver residents proclaimed that they were 
giving $1,000 each to buy machine guns for the local 47 th Battalion. The city’s 
 Province newspaper anticipated the frenzy of giving that would develop later 
when it called for a “healthy rivalry” among Canadian cities over machine gun 
donations. Responding to the challenge, over the next few days the citizens of 
Vancouver provided a further $23,000 in contributions.  28  
 On June 9, the militia department approached the Colt Company about 
purchasing 110 more weapons, to be paid for with the $100,000 donated by 
Drummond (the offer made by Carruthers seems to have been dropped).  29  Colt, 
however, was now besieged by war-related orders stemming from a number of 
Allied countries.  30  Its response was that it was now so busy that it could not guar-
antee the guns requested until the next year. Unable to wait that long, the Canadi-
ans determined to look elsewhere. As it happened, the militia department already 
had another American arms manufacturer waiting in the wings. In mid-April 
1915, it had been approached by the Savage Arms Company of Utica, New York, 
which held the patent in North America for the manufacture of another type of 
machine gun, the Lewis gun. The Savage firm expressed every confidence that it 
could produce all the weapons its northern neighbour desired, within the stated 
delivery schedules, at a cost of $1,000 per gun (compared to $750 for a Colt). In 
anticipation that it might be needed, the department had an example of the gun 
tested on June 2 and 3 by the military’s Small Arms Committee, whose job it was 
to provide its professional judgement on such proposed acquisitions. After test-
ing this single gun, the committee gave its approval, pronouncing that it “seemed 
to be a simple and efficient gun.”  31  
 Smaller and lighter than the British Vickers and the Colt, the American-
invented Lewis gun could not produce the same weight of fire and was more prone 
to jam. It was more easily handled, however, and, when carried on the battlefield 
as an infantry support weapon, could provide a welcome quantity of high-volume 
 26 The Globe (Toronto), May 6, 1915, p. 2. 
 27 The Globe (Toronto), June 2, 1915, p. 2. 
 28 See  Canadian Annual Review ,  1915 , p. 208. 
 29  LAC RG 24 1038 HQ 54-21-33-44, Surg. Gen. E. Fiset, Deputy Minister of Militia, to T. C. Boville, Deputy 
Minister of Finance, June 5, 1915; Fiset to Chairman, War Purchasing Commission, June 19, 1915. 
 30 On Colt’s production difficulties, see Grant D. Ellsworth, “Samuel Colt” in Gregg Lee Carter, ed.,  Guns in 
American Society: An Encyclopedia of History, Politics, Culture, and the Law (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-
Clio, 2002), p. 628; also Hew Strachan,  The First World War , Vol. I,  A Call to Arms (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2001), p. 1068. 
 31 LAC MG 27 Ser. II D9 Vol. 119, A. E. Kemp Papers, “Memorandum for the Master General of the Ordnance 
Respecting Savage Lewis (.303) Guns. No. 1 Provision of Guns,” June 24, 1917, p. 2. 
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fire from its 47-round magazine. Indeed, under the designation of automatic rifle 
rather than machine gun, it eventually became a staple of British/Canadian infan-
try tactics.  32  In the spring and summer of 1915, however, its particular strengths 
and weaknesses were not fully appreciated. It was just one of a number of weap-
ons on the market bearing the designation of machine gun. Indeed, the British 
War Office had found it an acceptable stand-in for the Vickers, which was not yet 
being produced in sufficient numbers, with the Canadians following suit in adopt-
ing it as a replacement for the impossible to acquire Colts.  33  
 Meanwhile, Borden, in the process of learning what was required to run such 
a massive undertaking as the Canadian war effort, was becoming increasingly 
dissatisfied with a military procurement process that, under Hughes, was beset 
by persistent irregularities, rampant cronyism, and continuing inefficiency. By 
a Privy Council Order of May 14, he authorized the creation of a body called 
the War Purchasing Commission. Chaired by a trusted member of the govern-
ment, Toronto businessman A. E. Kemp, its assignment was to take over the task 
of procuring war-related materials (except for shells for Britain, which were 
 32  On these developments, see Bill Rawling, “Technology in Search of a Role: The Machine Gun and the CEF 
in the First World War,”  Material History Review , vol. 42 (Fall 1995), pp. 77-82. 
 33 The British, in fact, assured the Canadians that they could use the Lewis as a replacement for the Colt, as they 
were doing the same to “make up for the deficiency in their own” heavy machine guns. See “The Lewis Air 
Cooled Machine Gun,” p. 1, in “Colt and Lewis Machine Guns.” 
  
 Image 3:  A soldier aims a Lewis gun, using a rifle as a pivot, ca. April 1915. 
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handled by another agency). The prime minister intended that the commission 
would introduce the much-needed systemization, rationality, and sound man-
agement practices that had been so lacking under Hughes.  34  One of the com-
mission’s first major tasks was to handle the crisis in machine gun procurement 
generated by Colt’s inability to meet Canadian demands. 
 On June 18, Kemp contacted the chief of the general staff, Major General 
Willoughby Gwatkin, for his opinion of the Lewis guns on offer from the Sav-
age Arms firm. Anxious to get moving on the matter, Gwatkin expressed strong 
support for the proposal, which had been in the hands of the militia department 
for a couple of months. The Savage Company could begin the delivery of 500 
guns within four months, Gwatkin assured Kemp, “the entire quantity to be com-
plete and delivered within six months.”  35  Gwatkin contacted and received a final 
approval from the British War Office, and, with the Canadian Small Arms Com-
mittee having already given its endorsement, on June 28 the government placed 
an order for 100 Savage Lewis Guns, using the money donated by Drummond. 
Ten days later, it went further and approved the purchase of an additional 400 
weapons of the same type, presumably the extras referred to by Gwatkin, which 
were to be paid for by the federal treasury.  36  
 Meanwhile, contributions of monies to help the government buy machine 
guns continued to come in, the largest single one from the province of Ontario. 
Under the premiership of the keen imperialist W. H Hearst, the province was 
resolute in its support of the war effort. Indeed, it had levied a small tax for the 
purpose and, by the conflict’s end in 1918, had contributed some $8.5 million 
to war-related causes.  37  In late June 1915, two senior ministers from the provin-
cial cabinet met with the newly promoted Major General Sam Hughes at Camp 
Valcartier to get his views on how their province could help his department pros-
ecute the war effort. Hughes informed them of the plans to buy 500 machine 
guns and suggested that Ontario should agree to pay a portion or all of the costs. 
Hearst’s cabinet agreed to cover the full sum of $500,000, although the formal 
public announcement was not made until July 20, at a large recruiting rally held 
in Massey Hall in Toronto, in the presence of the then deputy prime minister, Sir 
George Foster.  38  
 The dynamics of machine gun procurement would soon alter once again, how-
ever, with new personalities temporarily taking charge of handling it on behalf 
 34 Haycock,  Sam Hughes , pp. 231-230;  Report of the War Purchasing Commission , pp. 1-5. 
 35 LAC RG 24 1354 HQ 593-3-28, Maj. Gen. W. Gwatkin to A. E. Kemp, June 20, 1915; LAC RG 24 1038 HQ 
54-21-33-44, Gwatkin to “Troopers” [War Office], London, June 20, 1915; War Office to Gwatkin, June 21, 
1915. 
 36  Report of the War Purchasing Commission , vol. 4, pp. 72, 78-79. 
 37 J. Castell Hopkins,  The Province of Ontario in the War: A Record of Government and People (Toronto: War-
wick Bros. and Rutter, 1919), pp. 5-6. For Hearst’s strong imperialist and pro-war views, see the  Canadian 
Annual Review, 1915 , pp. 518-519. 
 38 On the arrangement made at Valcartier, see LAC MG 26 H1(a) 61 31129, Sir R. L. Borden Papers, G. H. Fer-
guson to Sir R. Borden, December 3, 1915. On the announcement at Massey Hall, see  The Globe (Toronto), 
July 21, 1915, p. 1;  The Toronto Daily Star , July 21, 1915, p. 5.  
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of the government. On June 28, Prime Minister Borden left Ottawa for a trip to 
England on war-related business, from which he would not return until Septem-
ber 4. Then, on July 3, Sam Hughes also left for an extended stay in England, not 
to return until September 3. Borden’s designated replacement during his absence 
was the long-serving cabinet minister Sir George Foster. Standing in for Hughes 
in the role of acting minister of militia was Alberta senator James A. Lougheed, 
Conservative leader in the upper house since 1906. Born in Toronto, Lougheed 
became an ardent westerner after his move to Calgary in 1883, where he thrived 
in both the law and business. Described by a colleague as “a Conservative of 
Conservatives,” he was a firm believer in Western development, the Empire, and 
the benefits of business efficiency.  39  Lougheed would take on the task of heading 
the Military Hospitals Commission, while retaining the post of acting minister of 
militia. His handling of machine gun procurement would not be one of his finer 
moments, however. 
 He and Foster prided themselves on their business acumen, and both were 
ardent critics of Hughes and what they perceived to be his maladministration 
of the militia department. Lougheed, in particular, saw his appointment as an 
opportunity to bring order to the prevailing chaos.  40  Among their many concerns 
was what Foster, in his personal diary, referred to as the “lack of foresight and 
utter inefficiency” in acquiring the additional machine guns that were so des-
perately needed overseas.  41  Indeed, the two seem to have taken on the cause of 
obtaining more of these urgently needed weapons as a major objective of their 
tenures as acting ministers, with Lougheed, in the militia portfolio, assuming the 
leading role. The order for the 400 additional guns mentioned by Gwatkin was 
approved during the first week that they occupied their temporary portfolios. 
 One cannot doubt the sense of urgency that Lougheed brought to his self-
appointed mission, but he also brought to it an element of naiveté and careless-
ness about details, which were to mar his tenure as acting minister. No doubt 
affected by some of the more hysterical claims in the press and elsewhere about 
there being practically no limit to the number of weapons required, he seems to 
have seen his responsibility to be simply that of getting as many guns to the front 
as possible. This was to be achieved even if it meant adopting some unorthodox 
methods, hence the support he gave to the citizens’ machine gun movement. It 
also explained his apparent indifference to the concerns of his professional mili-
tary advisors about how the guns were to be distributed among the battalions, 
specifically whether some should have more than others. 
 Whether wittingly or not, Lougheed touched off the citizen’s machine gun 
movement with a speech he made in Ottawa on July 8. Montreal’s leading 
English-language newspaper, the Conservative-supporting  Daily Star , printed 
 39 David J. Hall and Donald B. Smith, “Sir James Alexander Lougheed,”  Dictionary of Canadian Biography , 
vol. XV (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005), pp. 607-612. 
 40 See  ibid ., p. 610; Robert Laird Borden,  Memoirs , vol. I (Toronto: Macmillan, 1938), p. 510. On Foster’s 
views, see Haycock,  Sam Hughes , especially pp. 182-183, 238. 
 41 LAC MG 27 D7, Sir George Foster Diaries, July 22, 1915. 
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an account of it on the front page of its next day’s edition, and from there the 
story was picked up by papers across the country. According to the  Star , the 
acting minister had pronounced that “patriotic people of Canada & institutions, 
or others desirous of doing their bit, cannot do better than in giving machine 
guns.”  42  Stipulating that the money should be forwarded to the militia depart-
ment, Lougheed assured donors that the weapons purchased would be in addi-
tion to the number supplied by the government. As well, the money could be 
earmarked towards purchasing machine guns for battalions raised in the donors’ 
own localities. “Machine guns and more machine guns is the cry of the Mili-
tia Department,” proclaimed the  Daily Colonist of Victoria.  43  Canadians took 
Lougheed’s remarks as a cry from the government for help with purchasing the 
weapons. 
 Both Lougheed and Borden were later to insist that no one from the govern-
ment had played any role in instigating this popular machine gun campaign. 
Lougheed claimed that he had been misquoted, insisting to the Toronto  Star 
that he had “never made an appeal for machine guns either by speech or oth-
erwise.” He was, he said, simply commenting favourably upon donations that 
had already been made; he was not attempting to “start an agitation.” Once the 
campaign of giving had begun, however, he concluded that he had no choice 
but to go along with it. The “people wanted the government to take the money 
for this purpose,” he insisted, “and it is natural that the government would carry 
out the people’s wishes.”  44  It may well be that, when he made his remarks, 
Lougheed was contemplating something much milder than the massive cam-
paign that resulted. If, however, as he claimed, he was only accommodating 
himself to popular enthusiasm, his actions on its behalf can only be termed 
unduly avid. 
 On many public platforms and in numerous letters he sent out from the militia 
department, the acting minister consistently heaped praise upon the donors’ gen-
erosity and assured them that their wishes to assign their guns to a specific battal-
ion would be met. At a public rally in Toronto on July 31, for example, he spoke 
warmly of the movement’s “princely generosity and magnificent patriotism.”  45  
Typical of the assurances he made in official letters to donors is one he sent out 
on July 28. The militia department “would in every way endeavour,” he wrote, 
“to meet [donors’] wishes in assigning the gun they donate.” In what no doubt 
was a concession to resistance he was meeting from professional military mem-
bers of the militia department, he did acknowledge that this guarantee would be 
“subject to military necessity.” But, he continued, “it is not anticipated there will 
be any difficulty in carrying out the wishes ... particularly if the ... battalion is 
overseas.”  46  
 42  The Montreal Daily Star , July 9, 1915, p. 1. 
 43  The Daily Colonist (Victoria), July 10, 1915, p. 1. 
 44  The Toronto Daily Star , November 12, 1915, p. 5. 
 45  The Globe (Toronto), August 2, 1915, p. 1. 
 46  LAC RG 24 Vol. 1039 HQ54-21-33-55, Lougheed to Lt. Col. Birdsall, July 28, 1915. 
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 The experience of the Montreal  Star set a pattern for a number of newspapers 
across the country. Following its report on Lougheed’s speech, it was besieged 
by offers from Montrealers wishing to donate money to purchase machine guns 
for local battalions. Indeed, the paper soon found itself serving as a kind of cen-
tral receiving house for donations. “I cannot go myself because I am too old,” 
declared one donor,” but they say a machine gun is as good as fifty men and I 
am sending that as a substitute.”  47  Another wrote that “every story of the fight-
ing emphasizes and underscores the need for more machine guns for Canadian 
infantry.... Those of us who cannot go to the front have open to us a very effective 
way of doing something at a time and in a way to help accomplish the result we 
all desire.”  48  
 By the end of July, newspaper reports reckoned that $1.5 million had been 
donated nationwide. These monies, which, upon receipt, the militia depart-
ment forwarded to the receiver general, included the $500,000 contributed by 
the Ontario government. By the time the campaign ended in November, the 
total amount of money actually in government hands from the campaign was 
$1,265,752.92, again including the donation from Ontario.  49  Many who had 
pledged money had not yet sent it in, however, with contemporary estimates 
putting the total amount pledged at $2 million.  50  
 Donations sufficient to acquire 20 guns came in from the citizens of Hali-
fax, Nova Scotia. Contributions from Cape Breton Island would allow for 
the purchase of 30 guns; from the citizens of London, Ontario, 20; from the 
townspeople of Brantford, Ontario, 21; from Vancouver, 50; from a fund 
maintained by Quebec City’s major English-language paper, the  Chronicle , 
23; and from the “citizens and associations” of Montreal, 60.  51  The single 
largest contribution, next to that of the Ontario government, came from Ham-
ilton, Ontario, a city that was especially zealous in contributing to a host of 
wartime causes. The machine gun movement in that city had an energetic 
team of organizers and fundraisers, led by Lt. Col. R. H. Labatt, one of a 
number of over-age battalion commanders who had recently been repatriated 
from the front due to health and other problems.  52  These returnees spoke 
whenever they could of the dire need to obtain more machine guns for Cana-
dian troops.  53  For his part, Labatt was sufficiently persuasive that, on July 30, 
he received approval from Lougheed for Hamilton’s particular contribution 
to be the formation of a battalion – the 86 th – whose entire armament was 
 47  The Montreal Daily Star , July 12, 1915, p.2. 
 48  Ibid ., p. 2. 
 49  Hansard , April 3, 1916, col. 2648. 
 50  The Toronto Daily Star , October 28, 1915, p. 9;  The Morning Chronicle (Halifax) November 12, 1915, p. 1; 
 The Globe (Toronto), November 13, 1915, p. 6. 
 51  Canadian Annual Review ,  1915 , p. 211. 
 52  On Labatt, see Brereton Greenhous,  Semper Paratus: The History of the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry 
 (Wentworth Regiment) ,  1862-1977 (Hamilton, ON: RHLI Association, 1977), p. 141. 
 53  See  The Montreal Daily Star , July 12, 1915, p. 17, for coverage of their arrival in that city from the front.
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to consist of 125 machine guns. By September 23, it had enrolled some 998 
recruits.  54  
 French Canada, on the other hand, remained largely unengaged in the fund-
raising, no doubt reflecting that community’s lack of enthusiasm for this “Brit-
ish” war. A survey of the French Canadian newspaper  La Presse for the months 
of July to November 1915 shows that Quebec’s lieutenant governor, P. E. LeB-
lanc, contributed a machine gun to the 69 th Battalion, and the town of Outrement 
and the  société française et anglaise of Montreal donated one gun each.  55  By and 
large, however, reports of machine gun donations were few and far between in 
 La Presse , which supported the war.  56  Reports were even rarer in the other major 
French-language newspaper sampled,  Le Devoir , which vehemently opposed the 
war.  57  Probably equally revealing of this community’s lack of engagement with 
the machine gun campaign is the absence of letters from French-speaking cor-
respondents among the substantial body of records relating to the machine gun 
movement in the militia department files housed at the Library and Archives 
Canada. 
 The enthusiasm for donating touched all regions of English Canada, however. 
Contributions came in from the citizens and corporations of all sizes of com-
munities, from big cities to small towns.  58  Professional groups, church officials, 
women’s organizations, businesses, clubs, sporting societies, newspapers, and 
educational institutions across the land came forward with offers to buy machine 
guns. Enthusiasm extended to labour groups as well, with offers being made, 
for example, by the Joggins Coal Workers in Nova Scotia, the employees of the 
Angus Shops in Montreal, and the staff of the New England Fish Company in 
Vancouver. Some donors even offered to supply men to crew the weapons. If any 
part of society was under-represented it was probably agriculture, although some 
donations from smaller communities may have represented this sector.  59  
 For those who chose to contribute, the overriding motivation was the dire 
need, as publicized in newspaper reports and the accounts of veterans like 
Labatt, for getting as many machine guns as possible to troops who were 
either at or going to the front. The enemy, these reports stressed, possessed 
far greater numbers of the deadly weapons, the primary cause of the heavy 
casualties being sustained by Canadian troops. Their gifts, donors were con-
vinced, would help bring this deadly disparity to an end. Allied artillery had 
also proved inadequate and needed drastic upgrading, as did the Canadian 
Ross Rifles, which had shown themselves so sadly deficient at Second Ypres. 
But, for a time at least, the machine gun, perhaps because until then its effects 
 54  Borden Papers, 31078, R. H. Labatt to Borden, November 18, 1915; LAC RG 24 1831 G.A.Q. 7-46, “86 th 
Battalion – later Canadian Machine Gun Depot,” February 22, 1939. 
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had been unappreciated, seems to have captured the lion’s share of the pub-
lic’s attention. 
 Other motivations also played a part, of course. Some donors seem to have 
seen the gift of a machine gun as the sort of patriotic act that would free them 
from a sense of guilt about not personally enlisting. On July 21, for example, 
Toronto’s  Globe reported that a group of merchants from Bloor Street West met 
“to consider the purchasing of ten machine guns to be presented to the Canadian 
Expeditionary Forces in lieu of going themselves. Each machine gun is esti-
mated to do the work of fifty men and it is proposed that business men on Bloor 
Street who cannot themselves go to fight shall send one machine gun to take 
their place in the ranks.”  60  Although the  Globe remarked only on the merchants’ 
patriotism, one might well assume that those involved in the national recruitment 
campaign would have had different views. 
 In Halifax, the situation became critical enough that the local head of recruit-
ing was driven to pronounce: “We have offers of machine guns.... We can buy 
them, what we want is men, we cannot buy them.”  61  Yet, four days later, the 
 Morning Chronicle declared: “‘If you cannot enlist, you can help to purchase a 
machine gun,’ is a slogan heard all over the city.”  62  Whether such initiatives had 
any impact upon recruiting is impossible to measure. Of course, many of those 
who contributed, such as women, senior citizens, children, and corporate bodies 
such as universities, would not have been expected to enlist in any event. Also, 
as noted, a number of the offers included the crews needed to man the weapons. 
Although these offers were never accepted by the government, they may serve 
to counterbalance somewhat the incidences of machine guns being donated as a 
substitute for military service. 
 Lougheed’s obsession with sheer numbers created considerable concern 
among the professional military members of the department. Specifically, this 
had to do with his insistence that there should be practically no limit to the 
number of machine guns that a single battalion could take into battle. To this 
end, the acting minister continued to assure donors that the weapons they pur-
chased could be earmarked for a battalion of their choice, usually one from their 
home locality. This implied that some battalions could fare better than others, an 
impression compounded by the minister’s assurances that any number of guns 
could be donated to a single battalion. Standard military practice, of course, held 
that comparable units of an army should be equipped identically. Manpower 
resources, the availability of transport, the problem of maintaining ammunition 
supply, and basic fairness all made it essential that the number of weapons of 
a certain type possessed by individual units be consistent throughout an army. 
Lougheed seems to have been oblivious to such concerns. 
 The Ottawa  Citizen , previously a Conservative paper, but now, due to disagree-
ments with Borden, independent, was a fierce critic of Lougheed’s handling of 
 60  The Globe (Toronto), July 21, 1915, p. 6. 
 61  The Morning Chronicle (Halifax), July 24, 1915, p. 3. 
 62  The Morning Chronicle , (Halifax) July 28, 1915, p. 5. 
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the machine gun issue.  63  On July 15 it introduced the following note of military 
realism into the debate. It was “not inspiring,” it declared, “to think of some 
being sent into action with only a few machine guns, others because of the gen-
erosity of one or two private citizens with a few more. This is a national duty; not 
a matter of chance or charity or passing around the hat.”  64  Similarly concerned 
was the Master General of the Ordnance, Major General T. Benson, who wrote to 
Willoughby Gwatkin on July 13 that if “private parties wished to pay for machine 
guns there would appear to be no objection, but special regiments should not be 
favoured through having friends at court.”  65  Gwatkin was concerned enough to 
refer the issue to the Militia Council. Its ruling of August 2 was that “a regiment 
or battalion will include not more than 12 machine guns with not more than 4 
additional held in reserve.”  66  This still meant a total of 16 per battalion, which 
was four times the number approved by British regulations (and would never 
have been permitted by authorities at the front). It was, however, at least for the 
time being, a step in the direction of consistency on this critical issue. 
 Despite the decision of the Militia Council, equivocal statements continued 
to appear in letters that the militia department sent to donors who wished the 
guns they purchased to go to a local battalion. Then, on October 27, the recently 
knighted Sir Sam Hughes threw the whole matter into the air once again when 
he peremptorily declared that the “wishes of subscribers who stipulated that their 
contributions are to go to a certain stipulated unit will be carried out as far as 
possible. There is no instance on record where any battalion has been refused the 
right to take over more guns than are provided for in regulations.”  67  
 Lougheed and his colleagues began the serious ordering of the guns in late 
July. Clearly their hands had been forced by the Savage Arms Company, which 
saw an opportunity that could not be missed of benefiting from the current Cana-
dian obsession with the weapon. On July 22, Kemp received a letter from A. G. 
Barker, a representative of the firm, who had lately been spending a fair amount 
of time in Canada on company business. Well aware of the pressures being 
exerted by the machine gun movement, Barker reminded Kemp that there was a 
great world shortage of available machine guns at that time and emphasized that 
“no other Arms manufacturer of machine guns anywhere” could fill Canadian 
requirements within the stipulated time frame.  68  There was a good chance, he 
warned, that American legal restrictions, which hitherto had limited the sale of 
Savage Lewis guns abroad, would soon be lifted. This would make it impossible 
for Canada to obtain the weapons “unless they are contracted for at this time.”  69  
The cabinet met to consider the issue later that day, and the arms dealer’s alarmist 
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message obviously had an impact. Foster’s diary entry for the day notes that 
the members “discussed the question of machine guns” and records that they 
“ordered a large number to fill our own requirements and provide for the dona-
tion of the same that are rapidly coming in.”  70  
 The result must have fulfilled Barker’s fondest hopes. On July 24 a Privy 
Council Order approved the purchase of 500 Savage Lewis guns, using the 
$500,000 contributed by Ontario.  71  A week later the federal government placed 
another order with Savage for no fewer than 1,500 more Lewis guns, this time to 
be paid for entirely by the federal treasury.  72  The intention, according to Foster’s 
diary, was to build up a sufficient stock to supply both the guns the government 
would provide using its own budget and those paid for by the machine gun move-
ment. In total, the government had ordered 2,500 Lewis guns from the Savage 
Company, at a cost of $2.5 million.  73  
 As Canada at this time was prepared to maintain two divisions of 12 infantry 
battalions each at the front, this number of guns meant 104 for every battalion. 
By the standards of the time, this was an astounding number of machine guns. In 
comparison, British machine gun production at this time was sufficient to ensure 
that the 51 divisions of the British Army would have only nine per battalion.  74  Of 
course, whatever Lougheed may have believed, not all of the guns would have 
been issued at once. British Army regulations, which applied to the CEF, then 
limited the number of machine guns per battalion at the front to a total of eight (at 
the time four heavy Colts or Vickers and four Lewises). This still meant a more 
than ample supply, even for the four division corps that Canada would maintain 
in the field from August 1916 on. The number of Lewis guns authorized per bat-
talion did increase markedly in subsequent years, and a number of the guns issued 
would have been kept back for training purposes and thus would never have made 
it to the front. Nonetheless, by the standards of 1915, 2,500 Lewis guns would 
have meant a considerable machine gun bonanza for Canadians. It was, in reality, 
a far greater supply than Canadian battalions required and, in light of the acute 
need for other items of military equipment, a misallocation of resources. 
 By early August, probably because of the large number of weapons that had 
been ordered, support for the machine gun movement was beginning to cool 
within the department of militia. For example, in a reply of August 2 to a news-
paper editor who had written to ask advice on whether his paper should become 
a collector of funds for the movement, the department’s long-serving secretary, 
Lieutenant Colonel Charles Winter, implied that the campaign had outlived its 
usefulness. Although he expressed gratefulness “for the many generous offers of 
assistance” that had come in, Winter wrote that, “in view of the orders already 
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placed by the Department for guns, and the large number of donations already 
received it would be just as well if further donations were diverted into other 
channels of assistance of equal import and military value.”  75  Willoughby Gwat-
kin, who had always doubted the legitimacy of using private money to purchase 
weapons of war, was even more straightforward in a letter he sent to a prospec-
tive donor on August 4: “I will be quite frank with you; we need no more money 
for machine guns. We have already placed an order for ... 2500 guns of the 
Lewis type.”  76  Over the coming weeks refusals of a similar nature were sent to a 
number of prospective donors. However, consistency never being a hallmark of 
the department’s stance on the issue, on August 9, Winter wrote to the Ontario 
Agricultural College in Guelph declaring that the department would “very grate-
fully” accept from it a donation covering the cost of two machine guns.  77  
 Whether this increasing scepticism within the militia department was picked 
up by the press is not clear, but at the same time the near universal support 
of Canadian newspapers for Ottawa’s handling of the machine gun movement 
began to fracture. While newspapers suppressed political allegiances at moments 
of crisis in the war effort, in between the partisan attacks continued. In the imme-
diate wake of Second Ypres, even papers with pronounced Liberal leanings, such 
as Toronto’s  Daily Star and Halifax’s  Morning Chronicle , strongly supported 
the government in its crusade to acquire more machine guns. Now, however, the 
editorial stances of these papers shifted to renewed partisan attack, raising ques-
tions as to whether the government had ordered too many of the weapons and 
whether the donations had diverted money away from causes more needful of 
funds, most notably those of a charitable nature. Headlines in the Toronto  Star 
of July 29 itemized its new position: “Time to Call a Halt in Providing Machine 
Guns; Direct Money to Other War Funds; More Money Pouring in for Weapons 
than can well be used.”  78  Halifax’s  Morning Chronicle reported on August 12 
that the number of weapons obtained so far had “created not a little embarrass-
ment in military circles where it is realized that the offers so far made have far 
exceeded the requirements of the situation or their effective use.”  79  
 Before long, even Lougheed had decided it was time to bring the campaign to 
a halt. An article in Toronto’s  Globe of August 24 quoted him as declaring that 
“no more donations for machine guns can be usefully employed at present ... and 
therefore the suggestion seems timely that those who intended to give money for 
the purpose might usefully divert it to a ‘Disablement Fund.’[ sic ]”  80  The story 
was not universally picked up, however, and donations continued to flow in. 
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Moreover, starting on September 3, with the return of Hughes from his extended 
stay in Europe, the machine gun movement received a renewed breath of life. 
 Sir Sam always liked to claim, subsequent to Borden’s bringing it to an end 
on November 11, that he had had nothing to do with encouraging the machine 
gun movement. Rather, it had all been the work of his arch critic within the 
cabinet, Senator Lougheed. Yet the evidence indicates that Hughes was a strong 
supporter of the campaign. In August, a correspondent from the Montreal  Star , 
who had accompanied the minister on a visit to the front, quoted him as declar-
ing: “Everyone ... is interested and enthusiastic about the machine gun cam-
paign in Canada.”  81  Certainly, after he resumed his duties as minister he made 
strong statements of support, and under him the campaign not only continued, 
but regained momentum. The mixed messages that had begun to emanate from 
the department about whether or not the gifts would be welcome were replaced 
by uniformly positive ones.  82  
 What finally killed the machine gun movement was the opposition of the 
prime minister. Doubtless a mix of factors convinced Borden that it had to be 
ended. He had returned from his recent visit to Europe unimpressed by the Brit-
ish war effort, considering it under-motivated and slack, and determined that 
Canada’s should be run better.  83  The extemporized nature of the machine gun 
movement could hardly have seemed the most efficient method of undertak-
ing such an important procurement programme. Also, the political optics of his 
government relying on money donated by private citizens to help arm Canadian 
forces did not look good. Earlier in the war Hughes could, with Borden’s sup-
port, solicit donations from a few wealthy Canadians for help in purchasing 
machine guns. Now, however, something about a massive nationwide fundrais-
ing campaign for the same purpose carried the stigma that the government was 
not doing its duty in supplying the necessary weapons. 
 Of particular concern to Borden were the claims being made in the press that 
that the machine gun movement was diverting money away from worthy causes 
whose work was totally dependent upon private donations – most notably the 
Red Cross and the Canadian Patriotic Fund. One of the largest private charities, 
the Red Cross maintained a considerable network of medical and health-related 
services at home and overseas. Even larger than the Red Cross, however, and 
standing out among agencies dependent on private money, was the Canadian 
Patriotic Fund (CPF). With antecedents dating back to the War of 1812, the 
CPF’s mission was to provide monetary aid to the cash-strapped wives and moth-
ers of soldiers serving overseas. The government had approved the reinstitution 
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of the fund in the first week of the war, with prominent Montreal businessman, 
social reformer, and Conservative member of Parliament Herbert B. Ames as its 
“honorary secretary” and  de facto head.  84  
 As historian Desmond Morton points out, the fund was an integral component 
of the Canadian war effort. Separation payments given to soldiers’ families by the 
government and the sums they received from serving relatives’ pay all too often 
left these families in a state of abject penury. The CPF existed to provide further 
help in such circumstances. “Nothing could be more appropriate for a wartime 
charity than serving families deprived of a patriotic breadwinner,” writes Mor-
ton. For the government, he continues, it was certainly much preferable to the 
“obvious alternative,” which was “higher pay for all soldiers.”  85  A special advan-
tage of the CPF’s status as a charity and of its financial self-sufficiency was that it 
could make its awards based upon an assessment of a family’s need. Nationwide, 
teams of volunteers visited soldiers’ families and determined their requirements. 
National fundraising campaigns set targets across the country and did all they 
could to encourage a sense of obligation among those at home towards those 
serving at the front, summed up in the organization’s slogan, “Fight or Pay.” 
 By the end of the war the CPF had received a total of $47,153,819.35 in 
donations. It failed to meet its fundraising targets on only one notable occa-
sion. During the months of June to October 1915, it dispensed $700,000 more 
than it took in.  86  This shortfall is usually attributed to the needs created by 
Borden’s announcement, in July, of an increase in strength of the CEF from 
56,144 to 158,859. Certainly by the end of the month the news that the fund was 
experiencing difficulties raising money had become a public issue.  87  That the 
months in question were precisely the ones during which the popular movement 
to donate money to buy machine guns was at its height has been overlooked in 
previous accounts. Ames, Borden, and a number of newspapers concluded that 
the machine gun movement had absorbed monies which would ordinarily have 
gone to the CPF, thus contributing to its cash-flow problems. An urgent recon-
sideration of the role that donated money should play in funding specifically 
military initiatives emerged as a result. 
 The prime minister gave advance public notice of his intention to bring the 
machine gun movement to an end in a speech he delivered in Saint John, New 
Brunswick, on October 19. Here he enunciated the arguments to which he would, 
for the most part, adhere during the storm of protest that erupted over the fol-
lowing weeks. “The treasury of Canada ought properly to bear the cost of equip-
ping and maintaining our forces in the field and that has been our policy,” he 
insisted. Probably demonstrating how fragile he felt the government’s position 
to be, however, on a couple of major points he took considerable liberty with the 
truth. The government had on order sufficient machine guns “to equip two full 
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army corps up to the highest standard of the enemy,” he declared. These weap-
ons had been ordered “in the first twelve months of the war,” he insisted. This 
remark was literally true, but it evaded the fact that the order had been placed as 
recently as the previous July, largely in response to the pressures being exerted 
by the machine gun movement. In an even bolder deviation from what, judging 
from newspaper accounts and letters to the militia department, the Canadian 
public understood, Borden maintained that during his absence overseas his “col-
leagues had endeavoured to make it clear to the people that an ample supply of 
machine guns had been ordered and that these would be paid for out of the public 
treasury.”  88  Such assertions would, of course, have flown in the face of what most 
who had donated money for machine guns believed and what had, in fact, hap-
pened: that the acting minister of militia, James Lougheed, had made a special 
appeal for contributions to help the government buy machine guns so Canadian 
troops could meet the German enemy on equal, or even superior, terms. 
 Such political obfuscation was, and is, not rare, but the prime minister’s 
statements were plainly at odds with what newspapers were reporting and what 
Lougheed had been assuring donors for months. Borden was fortunate that Par-
liament was not sitting during these months, as it almost certainly would have 
become a venue of attack. Still, if anyone who knew the facts of the matter had 
decided to own up publicly about these decidedly exaggerated claims, enor-
mous difficulties, perhaps even a scandal, could have resulted. Doubtless Bor-
den’s major aim was to convey the message that critical weapons of war like 
the machine gun should be paid for by the government through taxation, not by 
enthusiastic, but occasional, voluntary donations. Maintaining that the donations 
had been unsolicited would have excused the government of breaking such an 
important principle. It would also have made it easier to return the monies or to 
recommend to donors that they be used for other purposes. Borden does seem 
to have been conflicted over this issue, however, for he went on to state that the 
monies would “of course be devoted to the purpose for which they were made,” 
which meant the purchase of machine guns. However, he followed this with the 
statement that in “dealing with other needs which will certainly arise the Govern-
ment will not fail to remember that these generous and free-will contributions 
have been made.” This implied that the government might, in compensation, 
contribute funds to agencies such as the Red Cross and the CPF, which, in Bor-
den’s view and that of an increasing number of newspapers, had been deprived of 
money that had gone into machine guns. But Borden did not spell it out in detail. 
 Much of the press and many subscribers reacted to Borden’s Saint John 
announcement with shock. The Montreal  Star , whose coverage had done more 
than any other paper to get the machine gun movement started, insisted that it and 
other newspapers had taken up the cause in good conscience, but “it now turns 
out that this was a delusion.” “Somebody has blundered,” the  Star protested, in 
announcing that it was considering returning the monies that it had collected.  89  In 
 88  The full text of the speech is printed in  The Halifax Herald , October 21, 1915, p. 8. 
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Halifax, the  Morning Chronicle accused the government of accepting “between 
one and a half and two million dollars for the purpose of purchasing machine 
guns which had already been ordered.” Taking up the suggestion that Borden 
had made in his speech, the  Chronicle made a case for a theme that was gain-
ing increasing attention in the press and elsewhere: that the federal government 
should “replenish the coffers of the Patriotic Fund,” deprived, as it was, of mon-
ies that had gone into machine guns.  90  
 Ames was not slow in taking advantage of the opening that Borden had pro-
vided. He began contacting people whom he knew to have been considering 
donating towards machine guns, urging them, instead, to give their money to 
his own, much more deserving organization. Oddly enough for a Conservative 
member of Parliament, Ames’s critiques were as severe in tone as any carried by 
the more critical newspapers. He too emphasized that the donated money was 
not really going to be used to purchase extra machine guns. Rather, as he put it 
to the Toronto  Star on October 28, the “government already had more machine 
guns on order than they can possibly need.” This meant that the donated money 
would simply go to pay for guns that had already been acquired “and thus save 
the taxpayers’ money.”  91  Although such critiques came close to accusing the 
government of fraud, they do not seem to have jeopardized the standing of Ames 
or his agency with Borden, who continued to do all he could to help the CPF. 
Indeed, Borden began to refer even more frequently to the possibility of the 
federal treasury providing the CPF with a sum equal to that given for machine 
guns. This shows the extent to which the prime minister saw the well-being of the 
CPF as critical to the success of the war effort, while the machine gun movement 
constituted a distraction, if not a nuisance. 
 Borden officially announced the termination of the machine gun move-
ment in Ottawa on November 11.  92  Press reaction to this final decision was 
even more rancorous than it had been following the announcement made in 
Saint John. Toronto’s  Globe, until then a moderate supporter of the govern-
ment’s handling of the machine gun issue, termed the whole thing a “fiasco.” 
No doubt to Borden’s relief, however, it laid the blame entirely on Foster 
and Lougheed. A word from Foster at the large rally in Toronto on July 
20, where the Ontario government’s contribution of half a million dollars 
had been announced, could have “ended the machine gun movement then 
and there, but no such word was spoken and the whole country took up the 
work of providing complementary machine guns.” For his part, Lougheed 
had “accepted the subscriptions sent to the Militia Department without 
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suggesting that they were not wanted” and, indeed, commended “the patrio-
tism of the subscribers.”  93  
 Borden’s Ottawa announcement repeated most of the points he had made 
in Saint John. Conspicuously absent, however, was any mention that dona-
tions already received would be used to buy machine guns. Instead, he now 
emphasized that this cost would be borne entirely by the federal treasury. As for 
citizens’ fundraising committees, he expressed hope that in the future all their 
energies would be devoted to raising funds for charitable agencies, “rather than 
contributions for machine guns, which have been amply provided by the Federal 
Government.”  94  He was, in fact, now declaring that no donated monies would 
be used to pay for machine guns, but he left open the question of what the gov-
ernment intended to do with the monies already received. It seems likely that 
Borden hoped the donors would agree to hand them over to the charitable causes 
that he had mentioned. His failure to be clear on the point resulted in further 
difficulties with sections of the press and some donors, however. It also left him 
vulnerable to the machinations of Hughes, who definitely favoured the donated 
monies being used to buy machine guns. 
 Despite the disapproval that Borden had expressed in Saint John, Sir Sam 
had continued to assure those who wished to donate money for machine guns 
that their gifts would be welcome. To the Middlesex Patriotic Society of Lon-
don, Ontario, he wrote on October 27, for example, that there “would be no 
broken faith in reference to machine guns at all.”  95  He made no further similar 
assurances following the prime minister’s Ottawa announcement, but, when que-
ried by journalists about what should be done with the donated money already 
received, he expressed the belief that it “should be held in trust to be expended 
on machine guns or otherwise as the donors might desire.”  96  
 Not surprisingly the public was confused. As expressed by the  Toronto Star : 
“Just what will be done with the money already subscribed and already placed 
to the credit of the Receiver General, nobody seems to know.” Victoria’s  Daily 
Colonist speculated that “the contributors may be asked to let their gifts go into 
the Canadian Patriotic Fund” or some other benevolent agency, which, by then, 
was probably what most assumed would happen.  97  The  Montreal Star , however, 
had had enough of the government’s dithering on the issue. It pronounced that 
the funds it had collected on behalf of the machine gun movement would be 
returned to the donors.  98  A Mrs. Charles Castle of Victoria was provoked enough 
to write to Borden declaring that she had “personally sent the money to kill Ger-
mans. If not to be used for this purpose, kindly order the return of the money.”  99  
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 Borden’s difficulties played directly into the hands of Hughes. A perceptive 
and remarkably candid note from Willoughby Gwatkin to the prime minister’s 
legal advisor, Loring Christie, of November 19 amply conveys the CGS’s view 
of where the minister’s loyalties truly lay. “Sir Sam is enjoying the situation,” 
wrote Gwatkin. 
 He puts the blame on Senator Lougheed, quite wrongfully, and is rubbing it in. 
Moreover, he suspects Sir Herbert Ames of trying to grab superfluous subscrip-
tions. He told me yesterday that it was not his intention to return or divert to other 
purposes money subscribed for the purpose of machine guns. But he was a little 
incoherent; and I am sure it would be best for Sir Robert to come to an understand-
ing with him on the subject.  100  
 In fact, Borden had already ceded the ground to Hughes. The previous eve-
ning, with the prime minister having departed Ottawa to attend the funeral of 
Sir Charles Tupper in Halifax, Hughes made the official announcement that the 
government would indeed use the donations it had already received to purchase 
machine guns. 
 The minister repeated Borden’s earlier statements that no more donations 
would be accepted from the public for this purpose. However, he went on to make 
the somewhat fabricated point that 1,000 of the weapons had already been ordered 
on the strength of the contributions already made. These guns were due to arrive 
at any moment, Hughes announced, and hence the monies now in the govern-
ment’s hands would be retained to pay for them. This, he emphasized, had been 
the prime minister’s view all along, presumably referring to Borden’s statements 
made in Saint John. Clearly the two men had reached a compromise on the issue, 
however, for Hughes ended his remarks with an announcement that reflected the 
views of both Borden and a growing number of newspapers that the government 
would consider paying a like amount of money to agencies such as the Red Cross 
and the Patriotic Fund as compensation for losses they might have suffered.  101  
 Reactions to this latest  volte face on the part of the government were initially 
as strained as previously. The Conservative, but fiercely anti-Hughes, Toronto 
 Telegram , which had opposed the machine gun campaign on principle from the 
start, deplored the “discreditable vacillation shown in the solicitation of funds 
for machine guns by one member of the government, their rejection by another 
and their final acceptance by a third.”  102  This proved to be the government’s final 
position on the issue, however, and by the end of the month tempers had cooled 
considerably. 
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 The citizens of Hamilton were at first outraged that their efforts in raising 
$217,000 to purchase machine guns had been wasted. As they realized that the 
government would now assume the task of supplying the necessary weapons, 
concern abated. At a meeting on November 22, the city’s fundraising committee 
decided to return all the money it had collected to the subscribers, as none of it 
had yet been forwarded to Ottawa. The committee did agree to urge subscribers 
to turn their money over to the Patriotic Fund, however.  103  Such moves marked 
the end of the machine gun movement as a major issue in the nation’s politics, 
and apparently also among most donors. 
 The compromise reached between Hughes and Borden allowed the govern-
ment to extract itself from the political difficulties generated by the cancellation 
of the machine gun movement. In this Hughes was more politically shrewd than 
Borden, in realizing that declaring that the money would indeed be used to buy 
machine guns was the best way of quelling the issue. In the end, however, this 
proved to be the only purpose the announcement fulfilled. The donations did 
not, as Hughes intended, help to buy machine guns. The only donated monies 
ever used to this end were the sums given by Drummond and by the Ontario 
government. Not a penny of the $661,273 that other donors contributed was ever 
spent. Investigations into the matter made by the historical section of the general 
staff in the 1930s revealed that the unspent donated money continued to sit in 
an account with the receiver general to the end of the war and beyond. In the 
late 1920s, officials from that department held discussions with the department 
of justice about returning the sums to the donors. With justice recommending 
against this move, however, all the monies were quietly rolled into the treasury’s 
consolidated fund.  104  Nor has any evidence been found that the government ever 
transferred an equivalent sum of money to the Patriotic Fund or any other benev-
olent agency. All in all, it was an inglorious fate for funds that had, for the most 
part, been given out of a genuine desire to help Canadian troops survive and 
wage war on the Western Front. 
 At least, one might conclude, a large quantity of machine guns had been 
purchased, which would supply the needs of Canadian troops for years to 
come. But developments at the front meant that this situation was not as 
straightforward as it might initially appear. At the time that Lougheed placed 
his order it might have been still possible for authorities at the Canadian mili-
tia department to assume that the Savage Lewis gun could perform the same 
role as the Colt, for which it had been ordered as a replacement. However, at 
the front the Lewis gun was increasingly taking on the role for which it was, in 
reality, most suited: that of a light, infantry platoon-based weapon. The more 
powerful, but heavier and more awkward to move, Colts and Vickers, on the 
other hand, were increasingly being assigned to stationary positions behind 
the trenches. Here, brigaded together, they could emit a more concentrated 
fire, which soon evolved into the use for which these weapons became most 
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noted on the Western Front, the emission of barrages of indirect fire over the 
heads of friendly infantry, in the manner of small-scale artillery. Indeed, in 
October, in the British Army, these trends were awarded doctrinal approval 
when Vickers guns were removed from the control of infantry battalions and, 
formed into companies of 16 guns each, placed under the authority of the bri-
gades. The Canadian Corps created its own brigade machine gun companies 
in January 1916, which was when shipments of Savage Lewis guns began 
arriving overseas, intended to fill a role for which they were entirely unsuited. 
Whether one can hold authorities at the Canadian militia department at fault 
for not anticipating this shift must remain a moot point, but it did mean that 
Canadian troops were left short of heavy machine guns, at least until suffi-
cient numbers of British-made Vickers at last began to become available in 
July 1916. 
 Nor did Canadian troops receive an ample supply of the much-valued 
Lewis gun. None of the guns purchased actually made it to the front. Here 
Canadian militia authorities, particularly the Small Arms Committee (whose 
missteps would require another full paper to recount fully) can definitely be 
held at fault. In all, 1,812 Savage Lewis guns were shipped to Britain during 
the first four months of 1916. As with all such undertakings, they first had to 
be tested and approved by authorities from the British Army. When officers 
from the British Machine Gun Inspection Department examined the Savage 
Lewises, however, they found them not only to be shoddily manufactured, but 
to contain many parts that were not compatible with the British-manufactured 
Lewis Guns used by their own army. Insistent that these weapons be at all 
times interchangeable between British and Canadian forces, the War Office 
rejected the Savage Lewises for active service. Canadian officials were aghast 
and protested, but in the end conceded that they had no choice but to go along 
with the British ruling. 
 A workshop was set up in east London where a staff of 60, supervised by 
a skilled gunsmith, undertook the costly and laborious task of attempting to 
render serviceable as many of the Savage Lewises as possible. In the end they 
succeeded in making 800 functional enough that the Royal Navy found a use for 
them, while 128 were deemed suitable for training purposes. What became of 
the remainder is not known, but it is certain that none made it into service with 
Canadian troops in the trenches. In their place, the British government supplied 
the Canadians with British-manufactured Lewises, as a  quid pro quo for the 
reconditioned Savage guns sent to the Royal Navy.  105  However, Canadian battal-
ions remained short of Lewis guns for some time to come. Indeed, although the 
arrival of the Vickers guns in July allowed Canadians to dispense with using the 
Colt as a heavy machine gun, they had to continue to employ a number as very 
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inadequate stand-ins for the Lewis until at least November 1916.  106  Ultimately, 
increasing British production meant that all Lewis guns used by Canadian troops 
thereafter would come from British manufacturers. Canada’s experiment in 
acquiring machine guns on its own could come to an end. 
 The widespread public and governmental anxiety in Canada about the 
machine gun and about the deadly toll that it took on Canadian troops in 
their first battles of the war has not previously received historical attention. 
Elucidating this phenomenon provides significant new insight into the state 
of mind of the public as well as into the inner workings of the government 
with regard to the war and war effort at this time, when serious Canadian 
engagement in active operations was just beginning. We see that the anxiety 
was sufficient to provoke the emergence of a national citizens’ movement that 
sought to help the government, through money that its members donated, to 
purchase additional supplies of the much needed “wonder” weapon. We see 
the emergence within the government of a similarly alarmed group, led by the 
interim prime minister Sir George Foster and, especially, James Lougheed, 
acting as minister of militia, who took upon themselves the task of acquiring 
as many machine guns as alarmist reports in the press and elsewhere were 
proclaiming to be necessary. 
 We see this enthusiastic duo taking on their self-designated task with great 
earnestness, but at the same time pursuing courses that were fraught with hazard. 
However laudatory the resolve of Lougheed in particular may have been, his 
handling of the matter suggests someone out of his depth and tending towards the 
same intransigence and erratic judgement that beset the much-reviled Hughes. 
To get what he wanted, Lougheed, like Hughes, proved willing to work at cross 
purposes with the views of military professionals in the militia department. The 
machine gun movement was clearly not needed, yet he pressed ahead with his 
support, despite the fact that it was increasingly causing problems for the govern-
ment. It led to charges that the government was shirking its own duty to supply 
machine guns and making claims upon the generosity of private donors at a time 
when the needs of charitable organizations, such as the Red Cross and the Patri-
otic Fund, were growing apace. 
 The task of sorting out these various issues and assessing their ramifications 
for the totality of the Canadian War effort fell to a much-harassed Prime Minster 
Borden. In an instance of public (and ministerial) enthusiasm meeting govern-
ing reality, he soon decided that the machine gun movement should be ended. 
Indeed, Borden felt strongly enough about the issue that he was prepared to 
spend a fair amount of his own political capital in doing so, not least in continu-
ing to maintain the barely credible stance that no one in the government had 
played any part in bringing the campaign into existence. In the end, missteps 
threw him into the hands of those like Sam Hughes, who saw nothing wrong with 
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the public helping the government buy machine guns. It was probably no acci-
dent that none of this money was ever spent, however, and the lasting outcome 
of the “great Canadian machine gun mania of 1915” was finally to establish the 
principle that the federal treasury, not a citizens’ fundraising campaign, should 
be responsible for acquiring weapons of war. 
 This was an important lesson, no doubt, but in the end the problem of both 
heavy and light machine gun procurement for Canadian forces in the First World 
War was only solved when adequate numbers of British-manufactured weapons 
became available. Whether it was principally due to the machine gun movement 
exerting pressures that caused the government to move too quickly, to the deter-
mined, but misguided, efforts of government ministers overeager to see results, 
to the vicissitudes of the international arms market, or to incompetence of the 
Canadian approving authorities, the procurement of machine guns must be added 
to a long list of equipment failures that plagued Canadian troops as they struggled 
to adapt to the brutalized conditions that typifified the first of the 20th century's 
total wars. 
